The early twenty-first century has brought sharply into focus questions about the supremacy of superpowers on the international stage, with a moving towards a system where no single state monopolises control. Such a reality, the editors of this volume claim, helps us approach the state of anarchy in the Mediterranean between the fourth and first centuries BC. The volume -developed from a 2013 conference on multipolarity and 'warlordism' in the ancient Mediterranean and published in Brill's Impact of Empire series -draws heavily on social sciences for theoretical frameworks within which to 'challenge certain prescribed perspectives on the relationship between war and politics in classical antiquity ' (p. 2) . While the idea of a multipolar world (and fluctuations between unipolarity and multipolarity) is readily accepted by the contributors, agreement on how applicable the concept of 'warlordism' is to interstate relations is far more contested.
All chapters seeking to understand the concept of 'warlord' engage with a theoretical framework, however there remains debate as to what, in fact, constitutes a warlord: not only is differentiation between warlord and illegitimate ruler difficult, but distinction between warlord and state-nominated general is, at times, problematic and several papers interrogate the positions of generals, who may be assessed against the criteria for warlords. For example, sees the Spartan general Lysander as possessing the main characteristics of a modern warlord -an individual who uses the opportunities that war brings for his (and others) benefit -yet he also emphasises that Lysander's actions operated within the political system, rather than necessarily against it. In the following chapter, Sekunda (pp. , lēstēs, pirata, usurpator, praedo, and latro (pp. 204-230) .
Nevertheless, they argued that from a functional viewpoint Sertorius' actions do align with a modern framework of warlordism. On different grounds Zoumbaki (pp. 251-379) concludes that we can neither called Sulla a warlord nor can we deny the application of the label, citing his fluctuating relationship to legitimate, central power at Rome, his reliance on his army as a result and his varied interactions (oppressive and beneficial) with regional communities. The difficulties of ascribing an individual's actions as 'warlordlike' are due not just to establishing a set of criteria, but also to the ever-changing nature of their relationships to centralised institutional power and how their position in relation to such power was perceived.
Very loosely speaking, there is some consensus that a warlord is an individual seen to be in some way acting independently from the state, deriving power and influence from military force rather than from legitimizing political power, yet the approaches given in the various contributions demonstrate the difficulty of coming to an agreement on an appropriate definition. Tuplin, in his examination of various regional secession crises between 540s-340s in the Achaemenid Empire (pp. 17-35) -the first of several papers to examine the relationship between mercenary armies and the rise of potential warlords -stresses that definitions of warlordism depend on the central government as a legitimate power, acting as a point of reference (a warlord rules 'independently of central government'), and that from the viewpoint of those attempting to secede from Achaemenid rule the goal was complete detachment rather than 'autonomous symbiosis'. What this volume repeatedly emphasises as key to the debate is the question of legitimacy, particularly given the accepted stance in Coşkun's study of potential 'warlords' in Hellenistic Anatolia provides a strong theoretical framework and detailed case studies (including an appendix cataloguing of military leaders with 'dubious legitimacy') for examining the phenomenon as part of a process of political break-down or the construction of new forms of governance. He succinctly stresses the rhetoric of legitimate rule as a key aspect in understanding the relation between 'warlords' and interstate polarity. The next five papers provide different approaches to understanding Roman power within a system of states and through the lens of warlordism. Eckstein (pp.
231-253) argues that the Rome's asymmetry of power did not equate to an empire, at least in the East, where it did not meet an 'imperial threshold' until the 140s. The critique of Roman 'imperialism' is continued by Champion's exploration of Greek perspectives of the Republic, concluding that it appeared to them less as a 'monolithic governing bloc' and more as a 'mercurial multipolarity', due to inconsistent behaviour by generals in the field and the shortterm political alignments of the senators (pp. 254-265). Rich's and Rosenstein's chapters, discussed above, work well together in offering chronological and thematic assessments of the internal stability of Rome, although Rosenstein notes that with Pompey's grants of imperium without public office the institutional defences against warlordism began to fail. This volume set out to challenge theses concerning the relationship between war and politics in a multipolar ancient Mediterranean world. It certainly emphasises the complexity of interstate relations and the need to look at the specific geopolitical contexts of interaction which provide opportunities for multilateral connectivity. The volume struggles in certain respects to tie down the applicability of 'warlord' to the ancient context, yet the discussion that arise as a result is perhaps all the more fruitful. The polarised position of potential 'warlords' in relation to centralised government is challenged both in terms of it offering a potentially beneficial 'working arrangement', and in terms of questioning the legitimacy of institutional forms of power and offering potential alternate forms of governance. CORNWELL h.e.cornwell@bham.ac.uk 
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